Supreme Court Ruling Slams Door on Immigrant Appeals

Noncitizens must file early appeals, risking chaos in immigration system.

WASHINGTON — The U.S. Supreme Court on Thursday ruled against a noncitizen challenging the timing of judicial review in immigration cases, affirming that appeals of removal orders must be filed before related claims under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) are finalized. The decision in Riley v. Bondi has drawn sharp criticism from Justice Sonia Sotomayor, who warned of “untold damage to basic principles of finality and judicial review” (p. 21).

In Simple Terms

The Supreme Court's decision in Riley v. Bondi means that noncitizens facing expedited removal from the U.S. must file an appeal of their removal order right away, even if their claims for protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT)—which prevents deportation to countries where they might face torture—are still being decided. The Court ruled that the removal order is final once the government decides a person can be deported, not when CAT claims are resolved, forcing noncitizens to file early appeals to preserve their right to challenge both decisions later. Justice Sotomayor dissented, arguing this creates confusion and unfair barriers, as it requires noncitizens to navigate complex legal rules or risk losing their chance for judicial review, potentially overwhelming courts with unnecessary appeals.

A Break Down of the Case More Technically

The case hinges on the interpretation of 8 U.S.C. §1252, which governs judicial review of immigration removal orders. The majority held that a removal order becomes final for appeal purposes when the executive determines removability, even if related CAT claims—protections against deportation to countries where individuals face torture—are still pending. This ruling requires noncitizens in expedited removal proceedings to file appeals immediately, potentially before CAT proceedings conclude.

Justice Sotomayor, in a dissenting opinion joined by others, argued that the majority’s interpretation defies established principles of judicial review. “The majority’s skewed reasoning betrays a fundamental misunderstanding of the final-judgment principle,” she wrote (p. 16), emphasizing that finality for appeal purposes typically requires all related issues to be resolved. She cited precedent, stating, “Every interlocutory order finally determines the limited question it decides, but of course that does not mean every order becomes instantly final for purposes of appeal” (p. 16).

The majority acknowledged that CAT claims are reviewable but maintained that the initial removal order “was … the Executive’s final determination on the question of removal,” constituting “the final order of removal” in the case (p. 16, quoting majority opinion at p. 6). Sotomayor argued this forces noncitizens to file “protective appeals” prematurely, creating “procedural hoops” that “set a trap for the unwary, who, if they are not intimately familiar with the intricacies of the finality doctrine, may inadvertently lose their right to judicial review” (p. 17, quoting West Penn Power Co. v. EPA).

Sotomayor further criticized the majority for ignoring recent precedents, such as Santos-Zacaria v. Garland (2023), where the Court rejected interpretations that would “flood the courts with pointless premature petitions” (p. 18, quoting 598 U.S. at 429). She also referenced Monsalvo Velázquez (2024), which avoided requiring noncitizens to “adorn their judicial petitions with a pointless challenge … or forfeit the right to review altogether” (p. 19, quoting 604 U.S. at slip op. 9).

The dissent highlighted practical consequences, noting that the ruling could overwhelm immigration courts and the Board of Immigration Appeals with unnecessary appeals. “A whole train of unnecessary consequences follows from requiring noncitizens to appeal in every expedited removal case, simply to protect their eventual right to appeal future withholding-only decisions,” Sotomayor wrote (p. 23, quoting Outland v. CAB). She noted that even the government, across administrations, supported the noncitizen’s position, recognizing the inefficiencies of the majority’s approach.

The majority countered that its interpretation aligns with cases like Nasrallah v. Barr (2020), which held that “a CAT order is not a final order of removal” and does not merge into such an order (p. 19, quoting majority opinion at pp. 6–7). However, Sotomayor argued that this precedent does not support the majority’s conclusion, as Congress explicitly required CAT and removal orders to be consolidated for appeal under §1252(a)(4) (p. 20).

The decision’s impact extends beyond expedited removal cases, potentially affecting standard immigration proceedings where removal and withholding claims are decided together. Sotomayor warned of “chaos” if the Board of Immigration Appeals remands only CAT claims, leaving noncitizens to file premature appeals to preserve their rights (p. 23).

To mitigate the ruling’s effects, the majority suggested that courts could hold premature appeals in abeyance and apply equitable tolling to the non-jurisdictional appeal deadline under §1252(b)(1) (p. 23, referencing majority opinion at pp. 11–16). Sotomayor, however, insisted that the government is constitutionally obligated to provide clear notice to noncitizens about the need for immediate appeals, citing the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause: “The Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law in the context of removal proceedings” (p. 22, quoting A.A.R.P. v. Trump).

Immigration advocates expressed concern that the ruling could disproportionately harm noncitizens unfamiliar with legal intricacies, potentially denying them access to judicial review. The decision, Sotomayor concluded, “is the rare holding that benefits no one” (p. 24), predicting long-term disruption to the immigration appeals system.

The case, decided in a 2025 term marked by contentious immigration rulings, underscores ongoing tensions over judicial oversight of executive actions in deportation proceedings. As Sotomayor warned, “Time will tell whether the Court will extend its illogic beyond politically disfavored noncitizens” (p. 22).